

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

REQUEST TO SPEAK, PRESENT A PAPER, OR PARTICIPATE IN A PUBLIC MEETING

1. Title of Presentation & Nature of Meeting:

Sino-Soviet Relations Briefing to be given at the Strategy Sub-Panel Meeting

Present Briefing and Participate in Panel Meeting

2. Name of Institution/Title of Meeting:

Strategy Sub-Panel Meeting, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca

3. Location:

Monterey, California

4. Time:

28-29 July

5. Name and Position of NIC Requester:

STAT

[Redacted]

National Intelligence Officer for East Asia

6. Identified as CIA? Yes Agency-sponsored? No

7. Dollar Cost to NIC (approx):

none (funded by CNO Executive Panel)

8. Classified/Unclassified (Delete one; if classified, indicate level.)

Top Secret (possibly SI/TK) — No T.S. material was transported

9. Other Pertinent Information:

R/Lm
OS/EAS

STAT

APPROVE:

[Redacted]

(Chairman, National Intelligence Council)

for 18 July 80

(Date)

STAT

CONCUR:

[Redacted]

(Coordinator for Academic Relations)

22 July 1980

(Date)

STAT

CONCUR:

[Redacted]

(Director of Security)

31 July 1980

(Date)

AGENDA FOR STRATEGY SUB-PANEL MEETING
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA
28-29 JULY 1980

28 JULY 1980

<u>TIME</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>BRIEFER</u>
0900	Introductory Remarks	Prof. Wohlstetter/ CAPT Patton
0930	Intelligence Brief (General)	TBD
1030	Strategy Brief	CAPT Patton
1200	Working Lunch/Executive Session	
1300	Intelligence Brief (Regional military capabilities)	TBD
1400	Sino-Soviet Relations	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 200px; height: 20px; display: inline-block;"></div> (CIA)
1600	Executive Session	

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29 JULY 1980

0900	Outlook for PRC	Prof. Buss (NPGS)
1000	Outlook for Japan	Prof. Olsen (NPGS)
1100	The Koreas	Prof. Olsen/ Dr. Wikner
1200	Lunch	
1300	Executive Session	
1700	Adjourn	

ENCLOSURE (1)

LIST OF ATTENDEES FOR STRATEGY SUB-PANEL MEETING
AT THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA
ON 28-29 JULY 1980

PANEL MEMBERS

Prof. Albert Wohlstetter (Chairman)
The Honorable Richard N. Cooper, Under Secretary of State
for Economic Affairs
Mr. Fred Hoffman, RAND Corporation
Mr. Andrew Marshall, Director of Assessment, OSD
Prof. P. J. Parker, Department of National Security, NPGS
Prof. Henry Rowen, Graduate School of Business, Stanford U.
Prof. Raymond Tanter, Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars, Smithsonian
Dr. N. Fred Wikner, BDM Corporation

GUESTS

ADM R. L. J. Long, Commander in Chief, Pacific
Mr. Michael Armacost, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
[REDACTED] National Intelligence Officer/Far East,
Central Intelligence Agency
Prof. Claude Buss, Adjunct Professor, NPGS
Prof. Edward Olsen, Adjunct Associate, NPGS

HOST: RADM John H. Ekelund, Superintendent, NPGS

STAT

ENCLOSURE (2)

PRIORITY

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SUBJECT: (Optional)

Request to Brief

Form No.
1-60

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FROM:

NIO for East Asia

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 18 July 1980

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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18 July

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NIC Admin

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #4654-80

1 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM:

Assistant NIO for East Asia

SUBJECT: Exchange of Views on Asia with Soviet and South Korean Officials

1. On 20 June 1980 the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia sponsored a one-day conference on Soviet-American relations in the Far East, dealing primarily with Korea. The conference, which was an invitational affair, strictly off-the-record, was noteworthy because of the willingness of Soviet and South Korean officials to meet together with US government and academic specialists for a frank discussion of contentious security issues in the Far East.

2. The Soviet officials were Dr. Valentin Berezhkov and Dr. Victor Trifonov of the Soviet Embassy in Washington and Dr. Alexander Primakov of the Soviet Mission at the United Nations. The South Korean official was Dr. Byung Suk Min, one of three political officers at the South Korean Embassy who apparently follows US foreign policy toward the USSR, China and the Third World. A list of the other participants is attached.

3. Dr. Trifonov responded to General Stilwell's presentation on the recent Soviet military build-up in the Far East by asserting (1) that the major change in the Far East in the past two years has been the effort by the US to reassert its supremacy in the area and (2) that the USSR has not done significantly more during this time than it had gradually been doing before that to meet the US military challenge in Asia. He said the USSR is very concerned about US efforts to include China in the US-Japan alliance and to improve China militarily and economically. He recalled China's urging the USSR in earlier years to take a firmer line against the US and Moscow's refusal to do this -- a major cause of Sino-Soviet differences in the first place.

4. Dr. Berezhkov spoke to the issue of Afghanistan, insisting that the Soviet invasion was a local action and not the precursor of Soviet military expansion in Asia. He said the Soviets had chosen to help the 'progressive forces' in Afghanistan, even though these forces were in the minority. He repeatedly emphasized the ideological element in the Soviet

SECRET

SUBJECT: Exchange of Views on Asia with Soviet and
South Korean Officials

NFAC #4654-80

decision to invade, refuting Professor Scalapino's observation that the Soviets had essentially been confronted with a choice between seeing a regime that they supported defeated or invading. Berezhkov took exception to any interpretation of the Brezhnev doctrine as implying that the USSR would never allow a country to abandon socialism and revert to capitalism. He cited Chile, Indonesia, and Egypt as examples of this happening without a Soviet response. However, in the case of Afghanistan, he said that ideology had in fact played a major role in Soviet actions.

5. Professor Scalapino's observations on the current scene in South Korea support the views expressed by Korea watchers in the government -- that there is simply no consensus of opinion in South Korea on a military vs. a civilian government. He believes that there are real philosophical differences between the major players as to whether or not democracy really can work in Korea and, thus, a major gulf of misunderstanding and distrust between the various factions. The Soviets had little to say about South Korea except that they would never agree to any major power scheme on 'cross recognition' of the two Koreas over Kim Il-song's objections. They showed no enthusiasm for improving relations with South Korea, however, either through increased trade or expanded contacts of an official or unofficial nature. They were defensive about earlier Soviet actions in admitting South Korean officials into the USSR, insisting that they had no alternative since these officials were attending meetings of international organizations, such as the World Health Organization, in Moscow. They tried to play down the significance of these moves in terms of Soviet-South Korean relations.

6. Along this line, it was conspicuously noticeable that the Soviet and South Korean officials made no effort to be friendly or to converse with one another. Although Dr. Trifonov and Dr. Min were seated directly across the table from one another at lunch, they did not appear to speak to each other.

7. On the subject of North Korea, the Soviets were surprisingly frank in acknowledging their serious differences with Kim Il-song. Although Dr. Trifonov has previously tried to convince US officials that the North Koreans privately supported the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, he made no such pretense at this meeting. He concurred in the general view that it was another in the long list of issues in dispute between the two countries. On other occasions, he has described Moscow's relations with Pyongyang as "friendly -- though they might be better," but at this meeting he agreed with the general characterization of Soviet-North Korean relations "as being not much better than Sino-Soviet relations, except for the absence of public polemics and a

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SUBJECT: Exchange of Views on Asia with Soviet and
South Korean Officials

NFAC #4654-80

border dispute." He said that he was convinced that Kim did not want a war in Korea, that Kim has told the Soviets this repeatedly and the Soviets believed him. He thought that Kim was actually somewhat fearful of South Korean military intentions at this point, considering, for instance, the possibility that Gen. Chon might provoke an incident to justify his consolidation of power in the South.

8. Trifonov acknowledged that the Soviets do not want to see any improvement in US-North Korean relations and, for that reason, are against bilateral US-North Korean talks, which Kim wants. The Soviets would see any breakthrough in US-North Korean relations as contributing to closer Chinese-North Korean relations, which they think are already too close. He showed no interest in the possibility of US-North Korean trade, although he acknowledged that all the other major powers are trading (in some cases, secretly and through third parties) with the other Korea -- the Chinese and Soviets are trading with South Korea, the Japanese with North Korea, and the two Koreas trading (through a third party) with one another.



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Attachment:

List of Participants
as stated above

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Conference
on
Soviet-American Cooperation
in the
Northeast Asian Region
June 20, 1980

Dr. Valentin Berezhkov
Dr. Richard E. Bissell
Dr. Hilary Conroy
Professor George Ginsburgs
Dr. Helen-Louise Hunter
Dr. William R. Kintner
Dr. Roy U.T. Kim
Dr. Chong-sik Lee
Dr. Edward A. Olsen
Dr. Alexander Primakov
Dr. Robert A. Scalapino
General Richard Stilwell
Dr. John J. Stremlau
Dr. Frank Trager
Ambassador Francis Underhill
Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupe
Dr. Victor Trifonov
Dr. Byung Suk Min

SECRET

SUBJECT: Exchange of Views on Asia with Soviet and
South Korean Officials

NFAC #4654-80

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- 1 - DDO/EA/Korea

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[redacted] (Key Bldg)
[redacted] Translation - [redacted]

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- 1 - State Department/EA/Korea - Room 5315 State
- 1 - State/INR/REA/NA - Room 8840 New State
- 1 - NSC/[redacted]
- 1 - DIA/Estimates, [redacted] Plaza 1012
- 1 - NFAC Registry

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NIO/EA [redacted] /1July1980

1. Warning of a North Korean Attack on the South:

An estimate of the warning time attack strategies and indicators that would presage an attack against South Korea by North Korea.

2. Integration of Japan into the Broader World Scene:

A discussion of domestic and internal factors that affect Japan's increasing role in the world economy, global security and international politics.

3. Outlook for ASEAN as a Viable Regional Organization:

A discussion of the forces that will bind ASEAN together or cause it to flounder as a regional organization with purpose and utility.

4. Outlook for Indonesia in the 1980's:

An examination of increased restiveness among Indonesians toward the Suharto regime and the opportunity afforded the opposition by the general election scheduled in 1982.

5. China in the 1980s:

Will estimate the direction Chinese policies are likely to take over the next decade, with particular reference to political stability, chances of modernization success.


MEMORANDUM FOR: NIOs, Assistant NIOs, SA/NPI

→ NIO/EA

When [] presented our tentative plans for producing interagency papers in the July 1980-June 1981 period to NFIB on 12 June, he promised to return to a later NFIB meeting with a more definitive list providing a brief description of the ground we intended to cover in each project.

In order to be able to do this, would you please provide me with a one-sentence "scope note" on each of your projects shown on the attached listing? May I please have such statements by COB Tuesday 2 July?

→ SA ?
BT }



Pls. fill in the blanks.

Date 27 June 80

Law

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #4671-80

1 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Legislative Counsel

25X1 VIA: [REDACTED]

National Intelligence Officer for East Asia

25X1 FROM: [REDACTED]

Assistant National Intelligence Officer for East Asia

SUBJECT: Congressman Solarz Briefing

1. At the request of Bob Rich, chief of the Korea desk, State, I arranged a CIA briefing on North and South Korea for Congressman Solarz' staff, in preparation for the congressman's trip to both Koreas in mid-July. The briefing was held at Headquarters on 30 June 1980.

25X1 2. Dr. Ralph Clough, who will accompany Congressman Solarz to North Korea, attended the briefing, along with Stanley Roth, legislative assistant to Solarz. Dr. Clough, [REDACTED] is on the faculty of the
25X1 Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies at George Washington University [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

25X1 3. The following NFAC analysts participated in the briefing:
[REDACTED]

4. That evening, I attended another briefing of Congressman Solarz, Dr. Clough and Mr. Roth at the congressman's home in McLean. The dinner-meeting was arranged by Bob Rich at State and was attended by Mr. Rich and Don Gregg of the NSC. The discussion was almost exclusively about North Korea, with only a brief mention of current developments in South Korea at the end of the evening.

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5. We have pointed out to Congressman Solarz (through Ralph Clough) that the inclusion of two journalists - a New York Times correspondent in Tokyo and a Time magazine correspondent in Beijing -- will provide an unparalleled propaganda opportunity to the North Koreans that they can be expected to exploit to the fullest. Both journalists have been included in the four-man delegation at Solarz' initiative. We have otherwise not taken a position pro or con the trip, but have simply provided briefings on North Korea.



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25X1 NIO/EA  1 July 80

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #4705-80

2 July 1980

25X1 MEMORANDUM FOR: Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment
THROUGH: [REDACTED]
Acting Chairman, National Intelligence Council
25X1 FROM: [REDACTED]
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT: China Policy Support Center Memorandum

1. Attached is a copy of a memorandum prepared by the China Policy Support Center (a recently-organized component of the China Branch, OPA/EA) which was distributed to me as one of a number of recipients, including Assistant Secretary Holbrooke and DAS Armacost in State, DAS Platt in Defense, and Roger Sullivan on the NSC Staff. This particular memorandum is one of a series produced by the China Policy Support Center over the past several months on a number of China-related topics. None of these were coordinated with me before leaving the building, nor as far as I can tell with anyone else in CIA, such as the other NFAC Offices or NIOs, and distribution in all cases embraced the highly-placed policy officers just noted.

2. I, of course, have no problem with analysts working on China maintaining contact with interested officers in other parts of the USG, and responding to queries for information or evaluations concerning Chinese developments. It has been my understanding, however, that type-script memoranda of this nature should be coordinated with the NIO if they are addressed to policy officers and contain estimative judgments or policy implications. In this particular instance I have no quarrel with the positions taken in the memo, but I can foresee situations arising wherein I might have some fairly important substantive differences. Thus, a certain amount of confusion could be created in the minds of the recipients if a memo issued in the name of the Central Intelligence Agency and hence carrying the cachet of the Agency is later questioned by me or by others in this building such as another NIO or OER, OSR, or OSWR.

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SUBJECT: China Policy Support Center Memorandum

NFAC #4705-80

3. I also wonder about the propriety of the China Policy Support Center's sending out commentaries and the like in the absence of a specific request. My understanding of the Center's purpose, as obtained from Mike Oksenberg who stimulated its establishment, is that it was intended to be a backstopping operation for US Government officials engaged in negotiations with the Chinese - a repository of information relevant to these negotiations as derived both from our own experiences and those of other countries, and a place where answers to important negotiating questions can be quickly obtained. I doubt that Mike intended the Center to be a self-directed think-tank operating outside the normal pattern of CIA activities. It should be noted that the NID on about the same date as this memo carried a very similar item.

4. Again, I have no desire to squelch independent initiative or to interfere with normal contacts between analysts and consumers. I do believe, however, that a greater degree of coordination on the activities and output of the Center would be in order.

Attachment:

Memorandum, dated 17 June 1980
Subject: Reported Soviet Offer
to China

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

18 July 1980

Dear Professor Moskowitz:

My apologies for the delay in answering your letter of 11 June -- a bit of leave plus the usual resultant pile-up of paperwork have intervened. At any rate, your suggestion for bringing together some of your Korean specialists and some of the analysts from here sounds eminently workable. The timing also would be about right; early October or a date not too long afterwards.

What I would propose is to bring up three or four people who have been working on political and economic matters and let you work us into your schedule. If you have any particular suggestions as to what subjects you would wish to see covered, please let me know. Perhaps you might wish to touch upon the foreign relations of the two Koreas as well as internal developments, and strategic considerations could be addressed as well.

In short, however you would like to arrange the sessions would be fine with us. Let me know your thoughts at your convenience, and if you wish to telephone, I can be reached at

STAT
[Redacted]

Sincerely,

[Redacted]

Professor Karl Moskowitz
Department of East Asian Languages
and Civilizations
Harvard University
2 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

//
STAT

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

DEPARTMENT OF EAST ASIAN LANGUAGES AND CIVILIZATIONS

2 DIVINITY AVENUE

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138

TELEPHONE 617-495-2754

June 11, 1980

STAT

[REDACTED]
National Intelligence Officer for
China-East Asia Pacific
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Ambassador Holdridge:

STAT

Thank you for your letter of June 5. I am pleased that you share
[REDACTED] interest in developing some interchange between your
analysts and Harvard scholars on Korea.

Though certainly timely, a program such as you suggested for July
would be difficult to arrange this summer. I will soon be leaving for
a few month's research in Korea and Japan, and so will another Korea
scholar here whom I would expect to participate in any meeting we
might arrange.

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Actually, when I spoke to [REDACTED] I had something much more simple in
mind. I run a colloquium series on Korea at Harvard, and I am interested
in inviting one of your Korea analysts to speak to the Korea Colloquium
on some aspect of his or her work. Both to promote mutually beneficial
interchange and, somewhat separately, to show students and scholars here
that their knowledge and skills regarding Korea have important applica-
tions outside of academics, I have been inviting people in government
and private industry whose work concerns Korea to speak to the Colloquium.
Since I am also quite interested in establishing the sort of interchange
which you proposed, I would like to suggest a combination of the two
which I think might be convenient and productive for both of us. My idea
is that a small group of your Korea analysts come to Harvard for a day
of private, informal meetings with our Korea specialists. In the evening
one or two of the analysts could speak to the Korea Colloquium on a topic
of their choosing. This could be done at any time during the school year
as long as you can give me at least two weeks advance notice. Harvard's
academic year begins on September 15, so the earliest likely date would
be the first week of October. If the informal meetings prove beneficial,
and I assume they will, then we could arrange more meetings from time
to time and with or without colloquia tie-ins.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Karl Moskowitz

Karl Moskowitz
Asst. Professor

STAT

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 3 July 1980
TO: 		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS: FYI: PLEASE RETURN <i>John - it see no problem with what he proposes</i> <i>Jim</i>		
FROM: NIO/EA		
ROOM NO. 7E62	BUILDING HQS	

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REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

18 July 1980


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NOTE FOR:

SUBJECT : Suggested East Asia Topics for Discussion at
the PRC(I) Meeting

The following are the suggested East Asia topics for discussion
at the upcoming PRC(I) Meeting.

- The increasing strains in US-Indonesian relations and the possible effects of these strains on Indonesia's attitude toward ASEAN, Hanoi, and the USSR. Are we taking Indonesia too much for granted, as Suharto appears to believe?
- What is the Administration's policy on military assistance to friendly countries in the East Asia region in terms of grant aid, FMS sales, IMET, and economic support? (This question is put forward because what appears to be inadequate military assistance has for years colored our relations with a number of countries, notably Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea.)



THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

21 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

STAT FROM :
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia

SUBJECT : Representative Solarz's Visit to North Korea

1. Action Requested: None, this memorandum is for your information only.


2. Background: Representative Stephen Solarz (D-NY) ended his first of a kind, four-day visit to North Korea on 20 July. Given the unprecedented nature of the visit, you might be asked to comment on it during meetings outside Headquarters this week.

3. Our preliminary judgment is that North Korean President Kim Il Song offered up little by way of departure from established policy when he met with Solarz in Hamhung on 18 July. Kim apparently laid his emphasis on US-North Korean exchange visits by scholars and artists and, according to press reports, Solarz said he would alert interested groups in the US. We suspect from this aspect of the Solarz visit that the North Koreans are currently putting their emphasis on "peoples diplomacy" with the US. This gambit is a strategy that was practiced with a good effect by the Chinese for many years prior to normalization of relations with the US, and it is possible Pyongyang may be receiving some encouragement from Beijing to follow a similar path. The intent would be, of course, to erode over time the US policy of not dealing directly with North Korea in the absence of representatives from South Korea, taking particular advantage of current US disillusionment over political trends in the South.

4. Indeed, Kim evidently made it plain that his policy of not engaging in tripartite US-South Korean-North Korean talks on the future of the Korean Peninsula remains in effect. He did, however, refer to the possibility of permitting exchanges of letters between North and

South and family visits to take place -- concessions on minor issues which might suggest flexibility while leaving the basic hard-line policies unchanged. In fact, it was indicated to Solarz by Kim Il Song and others that they viewed dimly the prospects for direct talks with the military-dominated government of the South which are scheduled to resume on 20 August.

STAT



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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

22 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Political Analysis
THROUGH : National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
FROM :
Assistant NIO for East Asia
SUBJECT : Request for Leave Without Pay

In keeping with the arrangement that was made as to my part-time schedule of work, I request leave without pay from 4-29 August 1980. I will return to work on 2 September 1980.

cc: NIC Admin Officer



THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

24 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Secretary of East Asian and
Pacific Affairs

STAT
FROM

:

[Redacted]

National Intelligence Officer for East Asia

SUBJECT

:

Atlas of the People's Republic of China

1. I am informed by Dr. James Lynch, Director of the Agency's Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research, that they are already in the process of updating the CIA Atlas on the PRC. However, the process will probably take some time and thanks to the complexity of changing all place names and other geographic cites to pinyin romanization, a publication of the revised atlas will not be before next year.

2. Dr. Lynch has been provided with a copy of your memorandum to me so as to be apprised of your comments concerning the "Historical Perspective" on pages 74-75.

cc: D/OGCR

[Redacted]

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